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INTRODUCTION
The Capital Jury Project (CJP) was undertaken in an effort to un-
derstand how capital juries make the immensely difficult legal and
moral decision of whether to sentence a defendant to death.' By in-
t Sydney and Frances Lewis Professor of Law, Washington and Lee School of Law.
Funding for the Capital Jury Project was provided by National Science Foundation Grant
SES 90-13252. The research and writing of this Article was supported by the Frances Lewis
Law Center. I would like to thank Professors Darryl Brown, David Bruck, Roger Groot and
Michelle Lyon for their comments on earlier drafts of the Article. I also am very grateful to
the large number of students, too numerous to name individually, at Hastings College of
the Law and Washington and Lee School of Law who spent countless hours doing logistical
work, helping conduct the interviews, and processing the mountain of data used in this
Article. And, of course, most of all I thank thosejurors who invested the time and emotion
in helping us begin to understand how capital juries make their decisions.
1 See generally William J. Bowers, The CapitalJuy Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of
Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995) (describing Capital Jury Project's purposes and
procedures).
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terviewing jurors who have actually served on capital cases, the CJP
has revealed factors that are consistently at the heart of every capital
jury's decision. The CJP has found, for instance, that concern about
the defendant's future dangerousness and the possibility that he may
someday be released from prison is a staple of almost every juror's
deliberations. 2
Although identifying common themes raised by jury delibera-
tions from case to case is obviously important and helpful, one of the
fascinating aspects of the CJP is the opportunity to examine those fac-
tors that often invoke dramatically different responses from jury to
jury. For example, why do jurors in some cases reverently single out a
professional expert as the witness who ultimately swayed their vote
against death, but in other cases view professional experts as "charla-
tans" or "bozos" who undermined the defense's case for life?3 Or, why
do jurors in cases in which the death penalty was imposed almost inva-
riably state that the defendant's lack of remorse was one of their chief
reasons for choosing death, and yet jurors in life cases who reject the
death penalty also consistently believe that their defendants were re-
morseless? 4 Solving riddles like these can be particularly useful in un-
derstanding jury behavior, because the process forces researchers to
go beyond the jurors' answers to abstract questions and to delve into
the deeper layers of how juries undertake their decision-making
duties.
This Article's general topic-the role that the victim plays in a
capital jury's sentencing decision-was partly inspired by such a rid-
dle. It is fairly standard fare for capital defense attorneys trying to
persuade the jury that their client should not be sentenced to death to
argue that the death penalty was meant to be reserved for the "worst
of the worst." The lawyer often will stress to the jury that although the
defendant committed a highly regrettable murder, his crime still was
not at the level of a Hitler, a Charlie Manson, a Ted Bundy, a Son of
2 See William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death By Default: An Empirical Demon-
stration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. REV. 605, 664-70 (1999);
Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases,
79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-9 (1993). Concerns about the defendant's future dangerousness
may in turn be a manifestation of the jury's view of the defendant's lack of remorse and the
seriousness of the crime. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Forecasting Life and Death: Juror
Race, Religion, and Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 291 (2001).
1 For an answer to the professional expert riddle, see Scott E. Sundby, TheJuty as
Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 V,. L. REV.
1109, 1139-44 (1997) (concluding from CJP data that professional experts are most per-
suasive when they explain or provide context to evidence provided by other witnesses).
4 For an answer to the remorse riddle, see Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Juy and Abso-
lution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1557 (1998); see also Theodore Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sony? The Role of Remorse in
Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599 (1998) (reporting results of an empirical
study).
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Sam, a Timothy McVeigh, or whoever is the embodiment of pure evil
dujour. The hope underlying the argument, of course, is that the jury
will agree that the death penalty should be reserved only for killers so
horrible that their names instinctively induce a collective gasp of hor-
ror, and that the jurors also will agree that the defendant does not
belong among such elite evil company.
Intriguingly, CJP research shows that jurors' reactions to this ar-
gument varied dramatically. Some jurors reported that the argument
had "backfired" in the jury room by generating a fair amount of anger
in the jury, and had actually added to the jury's sentiment for a death
sentence. Other jurors, however, stated that the argument had
helped crystalize their jury's deliberations and pointed them in the
direction of a life sentence, because it made them realize that the de-
fendant was not the type of person for whom the death penalty was
intended. The following riddle thus emerged from the interviews:
why were some jurors open to the "compared-to-other-murderers" ar-
gument while others became inflamed at the very idea that a hierar-
chy of heinousness exists?
As this Article shows, the answer to this riddle reflects how capital
juries generally use a victim's characteristics and behavior in making
their sentencing decision. 5 By using data from the California segment
of the CJP,6 this Article examines from several different angles how
jurors use victim attributes in their deliberations. In particular, the
Article attempts to decipher whether jurors in fact do make distinc-
tions between "worthy" and "unworthy" victims in deciding whether to
impose a death sentence, a topic about which courts and commenta-
tors have speculated at length.
I
WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS: Do JURORS DRAW A
HYPOTHETICAL DISTINCTION?
A central part of the Supreme Court's back-and-forth debate over
the role of victim impact evidence (VIE) at capital sentencing trials
has focused on the concern thatjurors might value the lives of certain
victims more than those of others. For instance, in holding that VIE
was constitutionally proscribed, Justice Powell argued for the majority
5 See discussion infra Part Ill.
6 The author served as the Principal Investigator of the California segment of the
CJP. The data for this Article were gathered by interviewing jurors from thirty-seven Cali-
fornia cases in which the death penalty was sought. Nineteen of the cases resulted in an
imposition of a death sentence, seventeen led to a sentence of life without parole (LWOP),
and one ended in a hung jury over the penalty. Each juror participated in an interview
that on average lasted three hours, answering questions designed to elicit both qualitative
and quantitative data regarding how his or her jury deliberated and what factors influ-
enced his or her decision.
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in Booth v. Maryland that "there [is no] justification for permitting
[the death penalty] decision to turn on the perception that the victim
was a sterling member of the community rather than someone of
questionable character. ' 7 He added in a footnote that "[w]e are
troubled by the implication that defendants whose victims were assets
to their community are more deserving of punishment than those
whose victims are perceived to be less worthy. Of course, our system
of justice does not tolerate such distinctions." The Booth dissenters
did not dispute that jurors might in fact value certain victims more
highly than others, but saw such an argument as missing the point
that VIE is meant to highlight the victim as an individual rather than
draw comparisons among victims.' The dissenters' view eventually
prevailed, as the Court in Payne v. Tennessee overruled Booth and al-
lowed the introduction of VIE.'
The Court's line of cases dealing with VIE thus raises a critical
question: do capital jurors distinguish between "worthy" and "less wor-
thy" victims? The initial answer, based on interviews with jurors who
served on capital juries, would appear to be no. Indeed, when asked
the question in the abstract, capital jurors tend to be remarkably egali-
tarian in their views on how a victim's status would influence their
decision of whether to impose the death penalty.
Jurors were asked whether certain victim characteristics would
make them: (1) "much more likely to vote for death," (2) "slightly
more likely to vote for death," (3) 'just as likely to vote for death," (4)
"slightly less likely to vote for death," or (5) "much less likely to vote
for death." Of the various victim types posited to the jurors (female,
child, respected person, stranger, troublemaker, criminal record, al-
coholic, drug addict, came from a "loving family"), only the child vic-
tim had a pronounced effect on thejuror's hypothetical decision, with
7 482 U.S. 496, 506 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). The
Booth majority also based its decision on the belief that the victim's characteristics did not
bear on the defendant's culpability, and that VIE would lead to "arbitrary" factors, such as
the articulateness of the victim's survivors, determining which capital defendants lived or
died. See id. at 505.
8 Id. at 506 n.8.
' ee id. at 517 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the sentencer's consideration of
the "particularized harm" caused by a victim's death is permissible so long as it does not
involve reliance on impermissible factors such as a victim's race). In Payne v. Tennessee,
Chief justice Rehnquist wrote:
As a general matter,.. .victim impact evidence is not offered to encourage
comparative judgments of this kind-for instance, that the killer of a
hardworking, devoted parent deserves the death penalty, but that the mur-
derer of a reprobate does not. It is designed to show instead each victim's
"uniqueness as an individual human being," whatever the jury might think
the loss to the community resulting from his death might be.
501 U.S. at 823.
10 Payne, 501 U.S. at 828-30.
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more than half of the jurors (53%) stating that a child victim would
make them "much more likely" to send the defendant to the death
chamber.'1 This strong reaction in cases in which the victim is a child
is unsurprising,' 2 as the child victim touches practically every rational
and emotional chord calling for the severest punishment possible: the
heightened vulnerability of a child, the child's loss of a chance to ful-
fill life's opportunities, a parent's grief over the loss of a child, and the
depravity demonstrated by someone who would prey on a child.
Although the jurors' reactions to the child victim might be ex-
pected, the failure of other victim types to trigger a strong reaction is
perhaps a bit surprising. Compared to the 53% of jurors who were
"much more likely" to vote for death if the victim was a child, the
other victim types triggered a much weaker reaction. The next strong-
est victim type influencing jurors toward death was the victim who
"had a loving family," but only 6% of the jurors said that such a victim
type made them "much more likely" to vote for death. 3 A female
victim provoked the "much more likely to vote for death" response in
only 5% of the jurors.' 4 The fact that the victim was a "respected
member of the community" led a mere 3% of the jurors to say that
they would be "much more likely" to vote for a sentence of death.' 5
A similar lack of a pronounced impact occurred on the other end
of the spectrum with victim types that might be viewed as "less worthy"
and thus might be more likely to sway a juror away from a death sen-
tence. The highest levels of response for a victim type that made a
juror "much less likely to vote for death" were the 4% for a victim who
had a criminal record and the 3% for a victim who was a "known trou-
blemaker."'16 No other victim type caused more than 2% of the jurors
to say that a given victim factor would move them strongly toward a
life verdict. 17
Although the percentage ofjurors who say that a particular victim
factor would affect their vote increases moderately when they are
asked whether a factor would lean them "slightly" toward life or death,
the far more striking finding is the percentage of jurors who say that
victim factors simply would have no effect on their vote. Setting to
I See infra Table 1. Appendix Table 1 provides a full breakdown ofjuror responses to
hypothetical victim types. All tables in the body of this Article that present only partial data
are presented with full data in a corresponding Appendix Table. As a result of rounding,
percentages in the Tables and Appendix Tables may not add up to 100%.
12 Stephen Garvey found a similarly strong response to child victims in the South
Carolina segment of the CJP. See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital
Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1556 (1998).
'3 See infra Table 1.
14 See infra Table 1.
15 See infra Table 1.
16 See infra Table 1.
17 See infra Table 1.
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one side the child-victim situation, in which only 23% of the jurors
said that a victim who was a child would not affect their vote, the vast
majority of jurors when asked about each victim type replied that the
factor would not tip them even slightly toward either life or death,
Indeed, apart from the child-victim, the hypothetical victim who trig-
gered the strongest response from jurors (a "known troublemaker")
still had more than two-thirds (68%) of the jurors saying that the fac-
tor would not affect their vote at all. 19 The "no effect" response,
therefore, is by far the most prevalent juror outlook for every factor
(except the child victim), whether the victim was a "respected mem-
ber of the community" (86%), a "stranger to the community" (96%),
had an alcohol (92%) or drug (89%) problem, or came from a loving
family (76%).20
Thus, in a manner consistent with the findings from the South
Carolina segment of the CJP, 2 1 the California jurors tended to value
all victims equally when asked how they would make their punishment
calculation. Table 1 sets forth the percentages of juror responses to
the various victim factors:
EFFECT OF VICTIM
TABLE 1
TYPE ON JUROR'S SENTENCING DECISION
Much More Likely Much Less Likely
Victim Type No Effect to Impose Death to Impose Death
Stranger in the community
(n = 144) 96% 1% 1%
Was an alcoholic
(n = 143) 92% 1% 1%
Was a drug addict
(n = 142) 89% 1% 2%
Female
(n = 130) 87% 5% 1%
Respected member of
community
(n = 132) 86% 3% 2%
Had a loving family
(n = 127) 76% 6% 2%
Had a criminal record
(n = 143) 73% 3% 4%
Known troublemaker
(n = 145) 68% 1% 3%
Child
(n = 140) 23% 53% 1%
18 See infra Appendix Table 1.
19 See infra Appendix Table 1.
20 See infra Table 1.
21 See Garvey, supra note 12, at 1556-58.
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II
WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS: Do JURORS DRAW A REAL
WORLD DISTINCTION?
At first blush, then, these findings suggest that the Booth Court's
concern that jurors would assign different values of worth to victims
was largely unfounded. As Part I indicates, when asked in the abstract,
the vast majority of jurors state that their decision would not be
swayed even "slightly" by whether the victim was a sterling member of
the community or someone with a criminal past. The only victim type
that seems to make a significant difference to jurors is that of a child,
and one suspects thatJustice Powell's arbitrariness concerns were not
focused on a jury's understandably heightened horror and outrage at
the murder of a child, in part because a child victim would reflect on
the defendant's culpability in choosing a vulnerable victim. 22
Yet, as often is the case with empirical research (or with voir dire,
as lawyers occasionally discover to their dismay), honest answers to
hypothetical questions sometimes do not match up with how individu-
als put a particular principle into action. No reason exists to believe
that the jurors were not answering honestly when they said that they
would be indifferent to whether a victim was a Phi Beta Kappa honors
student or an unemployed drug addict. That reply, however, is in re-
sponse to a general question that implicitly is prefaced with the
phrase, "if all things were equal," as in: "If a defendant were to brutally
rob and murder a person standing on a street corner because he
needed drug money, would it make a difference to you if the victim
were [a respected member of the community, a stranger, or someone
with a criminal record] ?" As every capital defense lawyer knows, how-
ever, the one constant in capital cases is that all things are never
equal. Context is everything, and, as will be shown, the same is true
for how juries process victim attributes.
Stephen Garvey, in evaluating South Carolina capital jurors' al-
most identical answers to the hypothetical questions, wisely advised
that the apparent conclusion that 'jurors value the lives of all victims
equally" must be approached with "extreme caution."23 He warned
that "[a] ctions speak louder than words" and pointed to several fac-
22 If the defendant, however, was unaware that a child victim was involved (for exam-
ple, because the defendant believed that no children lived in the house he was setting on
fire), Justice Powell might still have objected on the basis that the defendant was being
held responsible for consequences that he did not anticipate. Cf Booth v. Maryland, 482
U.S. 496, 504 (1987) ("Allowing the jury to rely on a [victim impact statement] ... could
result in imposing the death sentence because of factors about which the defendant was
unaware, and that were irrelevant to the decision to kill."), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808 (1991).
23 Garvey, supra note 12, at 1556-58.
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tors that might make such a general conclusion misleading.24 And,
indeed, if we go a step further and look at what juries actually discuss
in the jury room and how they focus on different victim attributes, it
becomes evident that although jurors may value victim types equally in
the abstract, when making the death penalty decision, they place great
emphasis on the victim and his or her actions.
A. Jury Discussion of the Victim: The Differences Between Life
and Death Jurors
That juries pay at least some attention to the victim is evident
from even a cursory examination of the jurors' descriptions of the
jury's deliberations. When asked, for instance, how much of the jury
discussion focused on "the reputation or character of the victim," 43%
of the jurors replied that their jury spent a great deal (11%) or fair
amount (32%) of time.25 Similarly, 39% of the jurors stated that their
jury spent a great deal (18%) or fair amount (21%) of time discussing
the "victim's role or responsibility in the crime." 26 If, as we have seen,
the vast majority ofjurors state that they would be unswayed by various
victim characteristics, the question naturally arises: Why are four out
of ten jurors reporting that their juries spent either a fair amount or
great amount of time discussing the victim's reputation and responsi-
bility in the crime?
The first step to answering this question is to break down the data
between the jurors who served on life cases ("life jurors") and those
who served on death cases ("death jurors"). As Table 2 shows, after
separating out the life and death juror responses, one finds that half
(50%) of the life jurors surveyed reported that a great deal (9%) or
fair amount (41%) of the jury discussion focused on the victim's repu-
tation or characteristics, while only a little more than one-third (36%)
of the death jurors reported that a great deal (13%) or fair amount
(23%) of jury discussion was devoted to the topic.2 7
Similarly, as seen in Table 3, life jurors report significantly more
jury discussion of the "victim's role or responsibility in the crime,"
with over half of the life jurors (53%) reporting a great deal (22%) or
24 Id. at 1557-58. First, Garvey notes, "whatjurors say and what they do are not neces-
sarily the same thing." Id. Second,jurors tend to give more weight to a victim factor when
it is actually present in a case. Garvey points out, for example, that "when the victim was in
fact a female, the percentage ofjurors who found that fact aggravating jumped from 4.2%
to 21.3%." Id. at 1557. Third, at the time of the studies, juries were not allowed to hear
VIE, which may now make victim characteristics more "salient" forjuries. Id. at 1557-58.
Finally, studies increasingly document the disturbing phenomenon that the victim's race is
a victim characteristic that influences juries. Id. at 1558.
25 See infra Appendix Table 2.
26 See infra Appendix Table 2.
27 See infra Appendix Table 2.
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TABLE 2
AMOUNT OF JURY DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON
"THE REPUTATION OR CHARACTER OF THE VICTIM"
Juror Type A Great Deal or Fair Amount None at All
Life Jurors
(n = 68) 50% 18%
Death Jurors
(n = 78) 36% 29%
fair amount (31%) of discussion, compared to the death jurors, of
whom only 29% reported a great deal (15%) or fair amount (14%) of
discussion.28 One finds a significant difference at the other end of the
spectrum as well, with only 18% of the life jurors saying that their jury
did not discuss the victim's role or responsibility at all, compared with
41% of the death jurors who related that the topic was not discussed
at all. 29
TABLE 3
AMOUNT OF JURY DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON
"THE VICTIM'S ROLE OR RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CRIME"
juror Type A Great Deal or Fair Amount None at All
Life Jurors
(n = 68) 53% 18%
Death Jurors
(n = 78) 29% 41%
B. Juror Perception of the Victim: The Differences Between Life
and Death Jurors
So why might life and death juries spend disparate amounts of
deliberation energy on the victim's attributes and actions? Part of the
answer appears to be that the victim profile of those cases that re-
sulted in a death sentence tended to be quite different compared to
those that ended in a life sentence. As Table 4 shows, jurors' percep-
tions of whether the victims in their cases were "innocent or helpless"
bore a strong correlation with the defendant's ultimate sentence of
death or life: death jurors (91%) were significantly more likely than
life jurors (62%) to have perceived the victim in their case as "inno-
cent or helpless."
28 See infra Appendix Table 3.
29 See infra Appendix Table 3.
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TABLE 4
JUROR'S IMPRESSION OF How ACCURATELY "INNOCENT OR HELPLESS"
DESCRIBES THE VICTIM
Juror Type Very Well or Fairly Well Not at All
Life Juror
(n = 70) 62% 24%
Death Juror
(n = 77) 91% 5%
Not surprisingly, then, although death juries' deliberations generally
did not focus heavily on the victim's character or role in the crime's
events,3 ° over three-quarters of the death jurors (77%) reported that
their jury's discussion had focused either a great deal (35%) or fair
amount (42%) on the "innocence or helplessness of the victim."31
This contrast between life and death jurors' perceptions also car-
ries over to the jurors' views of other victim attributes. Life jurors, for
example, were much more likely to perceive the victims in their case
as having characteristics suggesting that the victims had troubles in
their own lives. Tables 5, 6, and 7 present data for jurors' perceptions
about whether the victim had an unstable or disturbed personality, a
drug or alcohol problem, or was a "loner." For each category, life
jurors were more likely to perceive that the victim exhibited such
characteristics.
The life jurors, therefore, were far more likely than the death
jurors to be dealing in the jury room with a victim who was not per-
ceived as "innocent or helpless" and whose profile included areas of
personal problems. This point is emphasized by comparison of the
life and death jurors' responses to the question of whether they be-
lieved that the victim was "admired or respected in the community."
Fully two-thirds (66%) of the life jurors believed that the phrase "ad-
mired or respected in the community" did not describe their victim
well (21%) or at all (45 %),32 a belief that stands in marked contrast to
the 61% of death jurors who believed that their victim was "admired
or respected," as indicated in Table 8.
-0 See discussion supra Part lI.A and Tables 2-3.
31 Although life juries reported spending less deliberation time than did death juries
on the innocence and helplessness of the victim, 63% still reported either a great amount
(26%) or fair amount (37%) of time spent discussing the factor. As compared to the death
jurors, however, the life juries' deliberation time on this factor is far closer to the amount
of time they spent discussing the victim's character and responsibility for the crime. See
supra Tables 2-3. This suggests that at least part of the life juries' focus on the victim's
innocence or helplessness was in relation to the victim's role in the crime (i.e., asking
whether the victim was in fact innocent given the victim's actions). See discussion infra Part
II.C.
32 See infra Appendix Table 8.
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TABLE 5
JUROR'S IMPRESSION OF How ACCURATELY "HAD AN UNSTABLE OR
DISTURBED PERSONALITY" DESCRIBES THE VICTIM
Juror Type Very Well or Fairly Well Not at All
Life Juror
(n = 61) 38% 49%
Death Juror
(n = 58) 7% 79%
Especially striking from the jurors' answers to this question is the
strength of the life jurors' negative perception, with close to half of
the life jurors (45%) choosing the harshest response of "not at all"
TABLE 6
JUROR'S IMPRESSION OF How ACCURATELY "HAD A PROBLEM WITH
DRUGS OR ALCOHOL" DESCRIBES THE VICTIM
Juror Type Very Well or Fairly Well Not at All
Life Juror
(n = 58) 50% 40%
Death Juror
(n = 57) 23% 63%
when asked if their case's victim was "admired or respected" (another
21% chose the phrase "not well") compared to only 18% of the death
jurors who responded "not at all" (with an additional 21% saying the
description fit "not well").33
TABLE 7
JUROR'S IMPRESSION OF How ACCURATELY "LONER WITHOUT MANY
FRIENDS" DESCRIBES THE VICTIM
Juror Type Very Well or Fairly Well Not at All
Life Juror
(n = 58) 33% 41%
Death Juror
(n = 53) 8% 58%
C. The Clue to Solving the "Worthy" and "Unworthy" Victim
Puzzle
We now know that life juries are more likely than death juries to
have focused during their deliberations on the victim's characteristics,
33 See infra Appendix Table 8.
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TABLE 8
JUROR'S IMPRESSION OF How ACCuRATELY "WAS ADMIRED OR
RESPECTED IN THE COMMUNrY" DESCRIBES THE VICTIM
Juror Type Very Well or Fairly Well Not Well or Not at All
Lite Juror
(n = 67) 34% 66%
Death Juror
(n = 67) 61% 39%
reputation and role in the crime. The data also suggest a fairly strong
correlation between a juror's perception that the victim had a troub-
led life (e.g., had a drug or alcohol problem) and an inclination to
choose a life sentence rather than a death sentence. Are jurors, then,
contradicting their earlier abstract claims of not being influenced by a
victim's attributes? Recall, for instance, that 92% of all jurors stated
that whether a victim was an alcoholic would not affect their vote, 89%
made the same statement with respect to a drug addiction, 86%
avowed that the victim's status as a respected member of the commu-
nity would not influence their decision, and 68% believed that they
would be unaffected if the victim turned out to be a known trouble-
maker.3 4 Yet, all of these factors seem to correlate fairly strongly with
the sentencing outcome.
The answer appears not to be thatjurors are deceiving themselves
(or the interviewers) as to the effects the factors have on them, but,
rather, that they are now considering the factors in concrete rather
than abstract contexts. Keep in mind that once actual cases are in-
volved, the jurors no longer are considering the value of hypothetical
victims who are killed under identical circumstances (e.g., a random
robbery on the street), but are learning about a victim's attributes
from particularized evidence of how this defendant came to kill this
victim. And, as it turns out, those victim attributes that correlate with
a life sentence-drug use, alcohol abuse, unstable personality-tend
to manifest themselves in the cases through evidence of victim behav-
ior that can be termed "high-risk" or "antisocial." In other words,
when the jury actually hears about victims with alcohol or drug
problems, these problems usually are presented through guilt-phase
evidence that places before the jury a specter of behavior far different
from the behavior of an average law-abiding person. The victim, for
example, may have been shooting up drugs with the defendant or may
have been hanging out in a biker bar. By contrast, victims perceived
by jurors as possessing more "worthy" attributes are found in fact pat-
34 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text; see also supra Table 1 (reporting these
results).
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terns in which the victim was an "innocent" minding her own busi-
ness, a fact pattern that, as we will see, correlates strongly with a
sentence of death.
An immediate sense of the importance that jurors place on the
victim's behavior can be gained by examining the substantial differ-
ences between life and death jurors' responses when asked, "In your
mind, how well does 'too careless or reckless' describe the victim?"
TABLE 9
JUROR'S IMPRESSION OF How ACCURATELY "Too CARELESS OR
RECKLESS" DESCRIBES THE VICTIM
Juror Type Very Well or Fairly Well Not at All
Life Juror
(n = 64) 51% 33%
Death Juror
(n = 70) 11% 71%
As Table 9 shows, a significant likelihood existed that life jurors per-
ceived their victims as having engaged in careless or reckless behavior,
with over half of the life jurors (51%) agreeing that the words "too
careless or reckless" described the victim at least fairly well. In rather
stark contrast, only 11% of the death jurors agreed that the phrase
characterized the victim's behavior fairly well or very well. This con-
trast in the perception of victim's behavior is further highlighted by
looking at the other end of the spectrum: although over two-thirds of
the death jurors (71%) completely disagreed with a description of the
victim in their cases as "too careless or reckless" (responding that the
phrase described their victim "not at all"), only one-third of the life
jurors (33%) saw the victim in the same light. These perceptions are,
of course, consistent with the earlier finding that death cases were
considerably more likely to have a victim who was perceived as "inno-
cent or helpless" than were the life cases.35
The importance of the victim's behavior to the jurors' decision
can be further tested by shifting focus from the jurors' perceptions of
the victim to an analysis of the penalty outcomes based on the victim's
actions. One can begin by simply analyzing the cases based on
whether the murder victim was a "random" victim (e.g., the clerk who
happened to be working at the store that the defendant decided to
rob) or "a nonrandom victim" (that is, someone who had personal
interaction with the defendant prior to the killing, such as the defen-
35 See discussion supra Part II.B and Table 4.
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dant's girlfriend) .36 If this Article's working thesis is correct that ju-
rors tend to value victims who played no role in the crime more than
those who engaged in some type of risky or antisocial behavior, one
would expect cases involving a random victim (by definition someone
who played no role in bringing about the crime) to correlate closely
with a death sentence. As seen in Table 10, the outcomes of the ran-
dom-victim cases in fact support the hypothesis that if the victim was
an "innocent" in the crime, the jury becomes more likely to return a
death sentence.
TABLE 10
OUTCOME OF CASES INVOLVING RANDOM AND NONRANDOM VICTIMS
Victim Type Death Life Hung Jury
Random 10 1 1
Nonrandom 9 16 0
This strong tendency of the random-victim cases to end in a death
sentence is also consistent with the earlier finding that death jurors
consistently saw their victims as more "innocent and helpless" than
did jurors in the life cases. ' 7
One can gain further insight into the importance thatjuries place
on the victim's actions by focusing on the "nonrandom" victim cate-
gory of cases. If we break the nonrandom victim cases into two subcat-
egories of "risk-taking/antisocial victims"'3 8 (e.g., the victim was a gang
member) and "non-risk-taking victims" (e.g., a fellow employee at
work), we find the following results:
36 Several of the victims who are classified as nonrandom did not know the defendant
prior to the events leading up to the crime, but had interactions with the defendant be-
yond a random nonpersonal encounter. For example, the victim may have purchased
drugs from the defendant or may have met the defendant at a bar the night of the killing
and left with him.
3'7 See discussion supra Part il.B and Table 4.
38 This category encompasses victims who voluntarily engaged in behavior that a law-
abiding person would see as likely to bring the individual into contact with dangerous
individuals, such as a gang member, and also victims who engaged in antisocial behavior
that made thejurors view the victim unsympathetically (e.g., the victim was abusive in his or
her relationship with the defendant). Naturally, these two characteristics are not mutually
exclusive, as victims who engaged in high-risk activities often were viewed unsympatheti-
cally by the jurors as antisocial.
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TABLE 11
OUTCOME OF CASES INVOLVING NONRANDOM VICTIMS
Victim Type Death Life
Risk-Taking/Antisocial Victims 5 11
Non-Risk-Taking Victims 4 5
As would be expected from the prior findings based on juror percep-
tions,3 9 juries were less inclined to impose a death sentence in cases in
which the victim would be viewed as "too careless or reckless" because
of risk-taking behavior, as compared to cases with an "innocent and
helpless" victim.
Juries' leanings toward life in cases with risk-taking victims be-
come even more noticeable if the cases involving victims who were
involved in a drug deal are taken into account. The six cases involving
drug deals between the defendant and the victim appear to exist as a
sui generis category of risk-taking victim cases. In three of the cases,
the juries reacted like juries in other cases involving high-risk or anti-
social victims, using the victim's voluntary decision to engage in such
behavior as one reason to opt for life rather than death. 40 In the
other three cases, however, the jurors' narratives indicated more of an
attitude that the chance to sentence the defendant drug dealer to
death provided something akin to a "two-for-one" opportunity be-
cause the victim drug dealer already was dead. If we take the six drug-
dealing cases out of the risk-taking mix, the skewing of the sentencing
decisions toward a life sentence becomes even more evident, as seen
in Table 12.
TABLE 12
OUTCOME OF RISK-TAKING VICTIM CASES EXCLUDING
THOSE ENGAGED IN DRUG DEALS
Victim Type Death Life
Risk-Taking/Antisocial Victims
(excluding drug deal related crimes) 2 8
The victim's role in the crime also helps explain differences be-
tween life and death outcomes based on other victim types. At first
glance, for instance, the raw numbers for various victim categories
suggest that juries are more likely to give a death sentence if the case
had a female victim (58% of cases with a female victim resulted in a
death sentence) rather than a male victim (48% of the cases resulted
39 See discussion sulrra Part I1.B-C and Tables 4, 9.
40 For an explanation of why jurors might have this tendency, see discussion infra Part
III.
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in a death sentence); if the case had a married victim (85%) rather
than a single or divorced victim (33%); and if the case's victim was a
parent (60%) rather than a childless victim (27%). 4 1
Importantly, however, within each of these subcategories, the
cases that resulted in a life sentence generally were still those in which
the jurors perceived the victim as a risk-taker or as someone engaging
in antisocial behavior. For example, although almost two-thirds of the
cases with victims who were parents resulted in a death sentence (60%
of the cases overall), if the parent victim was involved in high-risk be-
havior, only one-quarter (25%) of the cases resulted in a death sen-
tence, while 83% of the cases in which the parent victim did not
engage in such behavior resulted in death sentences. 4"2 If one is will-
ing to generalize that married victims, female victims and victims with
children 4-3 are less likely to engage in high-risk behavior than are their
single, male, and childless counterparts, then the fact that cases with
these victim types are more likely to produce a death sentence makes
sense given the emphasis that jurors place on the victim's behavior
(and, at least within the California CJP sample, victims who were mar-
ried, female and had children were more likely to fall within the ran-
dom and non-risk-taking cases than were victims who were unmarried,
male and childless).
III
JURORS AND EMPATHY FOR THE VICTIM
A. "There, but for the Grace of God, Go I ......
What has been shown, then, is that although jurors may be genu-
inely egalitarian in their generalized views of various victim attributes,
in the jury room their reactions are influenced by the victim's involve-
ment in the crime and relationship to the defendant. In other words,
jurors may not care in the abstract whether the victim was a banker or
a welfare recipient. They do care, however, if the banker was mur-
dered while cruising a seedy adult bookstore late at night instead of
during a robbery while honorably carrying out his duties at the bank.
41 See infra Appendix Table 10. Cases involving multiple victims also carried a greater
likelihood of a death sentence than those involving a single victim (65% of cases with
multiple victims resulted in a death sentence as compared to 29% of cases with a single
victim). See infra Appendix Table 10. As with the other subcategories, the likelihood of a
death sentence or life sentence with either multiple- or single-victim cases varied according
to the victim's risk-taking or antisocial behavior.
42 The one exception was the married-victim category, in which only a single case
existed with a risk-taking victim, and that case did result in a death sentence. Part of the
difficulty in drawing valid Conclusions Once cases are broken down into these Subcategories
is that the sample size often becomes small, which argues for caution in their
interpretation.
43 Some victims obviously will have more than one of these attributes.
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That jurors would react most harshly toward defendants who
chose their victims randomly is not surprising upon reflection. An
individual who preys upon randomly chosen victims poses the starkest
image of the dangerous individual, and future dangerousness consist-
ently has emerged as one of the strongest factors for predicting a
death sentence.44 Such a defendant is someone against whom society
cannot protect itself, because he simply will pick out the most vulnera-
ble individual at the time of his crime. The lack of any ties with the
victim also diminishes the probability that a mitigating explanation for
the murder exists (e.g., that the victim had abusively treated the defen-
dant), leaving the jury with the perception of the defendant as an evil
person targeting innocent bystanders.
Adding to this already frightening specter is the fact that the ran-
domly targeted victim is quite apt to invoke within the juror a strong
sense of identification with the victim and a sense of "there, but for
the grace of God, go I." The randomly chosen victim generally was
engaged in an activity that the jurors themselves would have done
hundreds of times, such as withdrawing money from an ATM, filling
up the car with gas, or using a public restroom. The tendency of ju-
rors in interviews to describe the random victim as having been in the
"wrong place at the wrong time" took on a mantra effect. The follow-
ing juror's comment was typical of such responses:
She was just innocent. She happened to be in the wrong place at
the wrong time .... I guess that part sticks out when you see her
face down on the floor. I mean they surprised her in her bedroom
at gunpoint and executed her. One can't even feel safe in one's
own home.45
This inclination to identify with the randomly chosen victim can
be seen through several indicators. First, as Table 13 indicates, death
jurors were more likely than life jurors to state that they had
"imagined" themselves in the victim's position.
TABLE 13
COMPARISON OF LIFE AND DEATH JURORS' RESPONSES TO "DID YOU
IMAGINE YOURSELF IN THE VICTIM'S SITUATION?"
Juror Type Yes No
Life Juror 37% 63%
Death Juror 56% 44%
44 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
45 The author has verified all of the quotations in this Article for accuracy against the
primary source (i.e., the tape or interviewer's notes). The Article's descriptions of cases are
based on the jurors' recollections. When necessary, the author has bracketed material to
protect the anonymity of the jurors or to clarify the context of a quotation. To protect
confidentiality, the author maintains a file of all of the materials used in this Article.
2003] 359
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Moreover, as Tables 14 and 15 show, jurors were considerably more
likely to have envisioned themselves in the victim's position in the ran-
dom victim and non-risk-taking victim cases (cases that tended toward
death) than in the nonrandom and high-risk victim cases (cases that
tended toward a life sentence).
TABLE 14
COMPARISON OF JURORS' RESPONSES IN RANDOM AND NONRANDOM
CASES TO "DID YOU IMAGINE YOURSELF IN THE VICTIM'S SITUATION?"
Juror Type Yes No
Random 65% 35%
Nonrandom 38% 62%
The jurors' identification with the random victim's fate also sur-
faced through the jurors' narratives. In addition to the recurring
TABLE 15
COMPARISON OF JURORS' RESPONSES BASED ON VICTIM'S RISK-TAKING
BEHAVIOR TO "DID YOU IMAGINE YOURSELF IN THE
VICTIM'S SITUATION?"
Very Well or
Juror Type Fairly Well Not at All
Non-Risk-Taking Victim 56% 44%
High-Risk and/or Antisocial Victim 34% 66%
statement that such victims were in the "wrong place at the wrong
time," jurors would use phrases like "she ran out of luck," "it just
wasn't his day" or "she was just minding her own business" to capture
the crime's randomness. Jurors in these cases also often described the
victim in terms that expressly cast the victim as Everyman or Ever-
ywoman, providing descriptions such as: "she was just average Mrs.
America"; "she could have been anyone's daughter" (this juror then
immediately added a personalizing description, "she could have been
my daughter"); "a typical school teacher"; "a typical middle-class col-
lege student"; 'Just an average teenager."
Often most striking in these cases, though, was when a juror
would interweave the events that befell the victim with the juror's own
life. Consider, for example, how the juror in the following quotation
interchanges the facts leading up to the crime with her own daily com-
mute and then imagines herself in the victim's situation:
The victim was an elderly woman, 73 years old. She was driving to
the airport and taking [the interstate]. And [that interstate] is a
road I travel all the time because that's the way I come home from
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work. Anyway, she had a breakdown on her car. She would have
been beyond my stop anyway, I get off over on the [Smith Street]
exit-when you're going to the airport you have to go to the [Jones
Street] exit and pick up [another road]. Her car had broken down
and a "good Samaritan" stopped to help her, but instead he coerced
her into the car-or she probably went willingly, I'm sure she will-
ingly went in because he must have been such a nice man, helping
her along the way. And she got into the truck with him and instead
of taking her to where he said, he probably said he was taking her to
a gasoline station or whatever-he took her into a secluded area
and went ahead and just completely murdered her with what they
call the "coup de grace." He emptied his entire gun into her and
then threw her body out of his truck. He took off even her raincoat.
I feel the fright of the woman, because I'm also a woman on the
road. If you want to say what it has done to me, it's made me be-
come more careful, but, yet, the vulnerability of this woman, and
the situation that happened could happen to anyone. I imagine
that fear-the minute she realized that he was not going to take her
to the gas station. I would imagine that it would have been tremen-
dously frightening at that point, when you know you're captured
and there's nothing you can do-you're just panicky. That would
be to me, traumatic.
The juror added that after the trial she and every other woman on the
jury immediately went out and purchased car phones.
A juror's remarks in a case in which the victim was robbed and
killed while using an ATM similarly demonstrate how jurors often per-
sonalized the victim's fate. After describing the victim as "a regular
working guy," the juror responded to the question, "Did the victim
remind you of someone . . . ?" as follows:
Me. At the time he was killed, because of his age, same as myself.
Kind of a coincidence there, just because of the age thing, and,
plus, he was doing something, you know, a normal person does
probably without thinking about it, just going to an ATM machine.
So it was just kind of, you know, normal circumstances, he just hap-
pened to be at the wrong place at the wrong time.
When asked the single most important factor in sentencing the defen-
dant to death, the juror returned to the idea that the victim was just a
"regular" guy doing an everyday activity:
I guess a lot of it was the circumstances, you know, the guy is killed
in broad daylight going to an ATM to get some money because he's
going to do some work around his house. It's something everybody
does on an everyday basis in broad daylight. It could have been
anybody, so there's an outrage to it.
This theme was echoed by the otherjurors in the same case. One
juror, after being asked if the crime was "bloody," responded nega-
20031
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tively, but then felt it important to explain why, because of the victim's
innocence, the crime was horrible nevertheless:
I wouldn't say it was bloody. You mean how it struck me? Well, the
only word I can think of would be merciless, but I wouldn't say it
was bloody. I don't know, truthfully, that it was bloody. They didn't
say that and they didn't show any pictures, so I can't truthfully say it
was bloody. But it was a merciless killing. It should never have hap-
pened, [the victim] was just an innocent bystander, so to speak.
Another juror in the case was most disturbed by the fact that the
victim "was a careful man": he had "put his money in his wallet before
he turned away from the [ATM]," and he had gone to the ATM dur-
ing the day (the juror noted that ATMs are "especially scary if you go
in the evening; I never go in the evening, I go during the day"). Yet
despite all of his precautions, "it's just that you know, he, there wasn't
anything, any other way he could have been that would have stopped
what happened."
Particularly poignant were the cases in which the jurors imagined
themselves in the victim's position during his or her last moments or
as one of the victim's survivors dealing with the victim's murder. As
the following sampling of quotations illustrates,jurors often would de-
pict such moments in chilling terms:
I was trying to imagine during the trial how I would have felt had
that been my mother's body up there on the [autopsy] pictures and
the granddaughter who was especially close to her grandmother
[seeing the pictures]. It was easy to see that she very much cared
about her.
Interviewer: Is there anything about this case that sticks in your
mind?
Juror: The execution of the daughter. Her being tied up where she
was probably trying to squirm away and she was being kind of me-
thodically executed. I think that would kind of stick with me a little
bit.
I keep thinking about [the eight-year-old daughter] who discovered
the bodies. She will never be the same. She was just, I guess still is,
hysterical. I can imagine an eight year old coming home. She came
home from school, came in through the front door, and found her
mother [murdered]. She turned around and ran out screaming.
He had her.life in his hands. At that point, she was a total victim,
standing there naked in the cold. It was up to him what was going
to happen to her next. It was so cold-blooded, it was so
unnecessary.
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Interviewer: Is there anything about this case that sticks in your
mind?
Juror: How frightened the victim must have been in the last
moments.
When [the defendant, Mike] grabbed the victim, she was talking to
her mother on the phone. The mother heard her being dragged
off. He shot her in the head and then stabbed her numerous times.
I could have shot him.
Both of the victims reminded me of my mother and sister. Suppose
he did this to my mother and sister. I had no remorse for giving
him the death penalty. [The defendant] cried when he got the
death penalty. [I thought,] Geez, [Mike], you didn't ask those ladies
what they felt. He's [310] on Death Row, so he's got a while.
It was just very, ve-y sickening. If this would be your wife or your
mother laying on the ground in her beautiful evening gown, being
shot for nothing, her life taken for nothing. It's just disgusting.
I think as a woman you can't help but always think about being
raped. So I'd have to say 'yes,' [I did imagine myself in her
situation].
I keep thinking about how horrible it must have been for that
woman during those last few hours of her life.
I saw the [victim's family] sitting [in the courtroom], listening, and
I guess I tried to imagine how they were feeling, sitting there, watch-
ing things going on, pictures being shown about the murder and
the things being said about [how they found] her. I was trying to
imagine how they felt about that. You never know, I guess, unless
you're in that situation.
[The defendant] had told his girlfriend that [the victim] had
squealed like a pig and pled for his life and Ijust kept seeing that in
my mind, a twenty-seven-year-old man with two kids on his hands
and knees begging for his life and he shot him anyway. Ijust can't
imagine how his life was at that moment.
In a number of the cases,jurors did not even need to imagine the
victim's state of mind, because a victim from one of the defendant's
prior crimes testified during the penalty phase. As would be ex-
pected, these witnesses had an especially powerful impact on the ju-
rors as they watched the witness testify. A juror described one such
witness as
terrified and when she got through testifying she couldn't move. It
took every ounce of her strength to be in the room with him and to
re-live the crime. She was completely exhausted. She just stayed
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there [in the witness chair]. We all left, and I have no idea how
long she stayed there.
Another juror said of the same witness, "We felt that she was very
brave to come and testify. It must have been difficult for her to go
over the details of the attack while sitting and facing the defendant."
B. High-Risk, Antisocial, and Unsympathetic Victims
By contrast, the jurors in the cases involving nonrandom victims
generally dealt with fact scenarios in which they were unlikely to imag-
ine themselves confronting someone like the defendant. 46 This lack
of identification with the victim was true even in the cases not involv-
ing high-risk victims, because these cases often involved matters indi-
vidualized to the defendant's relationship with the victim, such as a
soured romantic relationship or a troubled family situation. 47
As would be expected, though, the lack of identification was espe-
cially evident in cases in which the victim had engaged in high-risk
behavior. Unlike in the random-victim cases, the jurors simply did not
have a feeling of "there, but for the grace of God, go I" when hearing
about victims who had, for example, been involved in a drug deal, had
been a member of a prison gang, or had allowed themselves to be
"picked up" at pornographic bookstores or seedy taverns. One juror
typified the reaction to high-risk victims when, after being asked if the
victim was "innocent," he commented, "I wouldn't say she was an in-
nocent victim, because, well, what was she doing in the biker bar?"
Or, as a juror in another case said, "They were all dope fiends; they
provided each other dope. [The victim] reminded me of people who
get so screwed up that something bad was bound to happen to
them-maybe not this serious, but something bad."
Not surprisingly, given that the jurors as law-abiding individuals
were unlikely to find themselves engaged in drug deals or hanging out
at biker bars, the jurors found these fact patterns less personally
threatening and thus were not as likely to see the defendant as posing
a future danger if given a life sentence. Consider how one juror in
explaining the jury's life sentence rather remarkably cabins a defen-
dant's violent tendencies to the world of drug dealing:
Everybody came to the conclusion that nobody felt threatened by
him as long as they were not a competitor in selling drugs or not a
threat to him-either a business threat or a physical threat. They felt
he was probably the kind of guy you can have over, have dinner with, discuss
politics, whatever. Now, if you were a rival or in conflict over drugs-
his business-then he would have no compunction about removing
you as an obstacle with whatever it took.
46 See supra Table 15.
47 See infra Appendix Table IL.
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Another juror in the same case somewhat cavalierly characterized the
defendant's double killing as 'Just business" in the same tone that a
lawyer might use in describing the representation of an unpleasant
client. These jurors did not personalize the danger that the defen-
dant represented because they saw it as limited to drug dealing, and
the jurors clearly did not see themselves as likely to be buying crack on
a street corner late some night.
Moreover, jurors viewed many high-risk victims as unsympathetic
or even unlikable. Jurors in these cases would give opinions like, "She
was a hippie sort of person, a bit of a gypsy. I've known people like
that. I didn't approve of her actions, because she put herself in dan-
ger. She was very unwise." Another juror describing the same victim
speculated that "she might have had, well not a death wish, but a lack
of self-confidence" because she had also previously been in a relation-
ship involving physical abuse.
In another case, the victim had been "picked up" at a gay adult
bookstore late at night and murdered. Severaljurors appeared troub-
led by the victim's homosexuality itself. One juror expressly stated
that he was "disgusted" that the victim was gay, and another juror,
when asked if the victim was "admired or respected in the commu-
nity," chose the "not very well" response, adding that the victim was
"gay and on his way out [of the community]." Still another juror,
when asked the standard questionnaire inquiry of whether the victim
was "disturbed or unstable," stated, "He had been a married man with
children who later in life decided to admit he was gay." The juror
then quickly added, "I doubt if that fits here."
Even those jurors who did not expressly disapprove of the victim's
sexuality almost universally had qualms about what they saw as a pro-
miscuous lifestyle. One juror expressed "sadness over [the victim's]
lifestyle's toll: he had TB, was gay, impotent and had to use drugs for
an erection. He was having sex constantly with other men." Another
juror articulated his uneasiness with the victim's lifestyle by stating, "I
think, you know, his lifestyle he's certainly entitled to, but it-the lifes-
tyle-is somewhat disturbing, I guess." Many of the jurors focused in
particular on what they saw as the victim's risk taking. One juror,
when asked if the victim had been reckless, replied, "Yes, in the sense
of going to a bookstore and being picked up-careless, reckless, you
could say other things about it too."'48 Another juror, when asked if
48 When asked if he had imagined himself in the victim's family's position, the same
juror elaborated:
It might be interesting to know them. My problem with them is, and I
don't know whether this fits into your thing, I'm not, well, I guess I'm criti-
cal of them in the sense of, they should have, the guy had a real poor lifes-
tyle and it seemed to me his family knew about it. There was little evidence
that they did anything to try to help the guy. The guy had a problem. So
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the victim was "innocent or helpless," replied, "Helpless, yes, but not
innocent." Yet anotherjuror simply stated that if the victim had been
more careful, "he would be alive today."
In a particularly memorable case, the victim, who was the defen-
dant's girlfriend, had been very abusive. According to the jurors, she
"was extremely cruel" and "pushed people further than most humans
could take." One juror strung together a flurry of unflattering words
to describe the victim (describing her as "a bitch, selfish, used people,
aggressive, abusive"), and then went on to say that "I think she de-
served what she got." Another juror, when asked about the victim,
said, "It makes me sick to even think about her." By contrast, the de-
fendant was viewed as "a very easygoing man that had been taken ad-
vantage of by this lady." On the night of the killing, the defendant
had brought a gun with him "to scare her" because she had been so
abusive, but she still "egged him on and egged him on and finally said,
'well, shoot me then,"' at which point he shot her.
Without more, the case probably would not have been prose-
cuted as capital murder, but, after killing his girlfriend, the defendant
then also shot and killed the victim's brother who was in the house at
the time. This second killing constituted a "special circumstance,"
making the defendant eligible for the death penalty. Although the
jurors were troubled by the killing of the brother ("the brother just
happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time"), overall the
jurors saw the defendant as someone who had found himself caught
up with a bad person and made a tragic decision that he now deeply
regretted. Indeed, several jurors were upset that he would never be
eligible for parole, with one juror saying that the defendant "was kind
of soft with me in my heart," a sentiment not normally voiced by jurors
who have convicted a defendant of capital murder.
Although the jury's dislike of the girlfriend victim was unusual in
its intensity, other cases also led jurors to view the victim with distaste.
A juror in a drug-related killing called the victims "punks" and "low-
lifes" and was quite candid about his feelings when he said, "I'll be
honest with you, I guess they will be missed by their immediate family,
but, as far as I am concerned, society will not miss them." Ajuror in a
different case, in which the victim was variously described by jurors in
terms such as "scumbucket of the earth" and "abusive asshole," ex-
pressed similar sentiments, though with an undercurrent of guilt that
that's, I'm maybe not as tolerant of them as other people would be, they
should have, it seems to me they have an obligation if you really love some-
body and care for somebody, to set him on the right track. They didn't
seem to do that. They seemed to say, "well, you are what you are and you're
entitled to be that. You're not violating any law, so go ahead and do
whatever you want to do." Certainly that is an attitude I don't agree with,
but it is an attitude.
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she should not feel that way: "The defendant wasn't out killing a
bunch of people; she killed one person who wasn't of the best reputa-
ble character to begin with-now that's awful isn't it? But I guess you
have to get down to that, you know?" Her mixed feelings were not
unusual. Jurors in such cases frequently described the victim in nega-
tive terms and then would hurriedly add a disclaimer, like the juror
who explained, "The victim was a wheeler-dealer type, a very conniv-
ing person. At the time of the killing, he was being investigated for
murdering his girlfriend-do you believe that? Isn't it interesting? So
maybe it was a mercy killing [laughs]. Uh, not that it justified him
being murdered." And although juries in such cases occasionally had
a "pox-on-both-your-houses" reaction and gave the death penalty-es-
pecially if both the defendant and victim were part of a narcotics
transaction gone awry-the far more common reaction was to give a
life sentence when the jury saw the victim as distasteful. An inter-
viewer could quickly get a sense of a juror's view of the victim, because
one of the first questions asked of a juror was the victim's occupation.
If the juror disliked the victim, the reply would be along the lines of
"pimping."
C. Solving the Riddle
How readily a juror can identify with the victim and her activities
at the time of the killing thus appears to be a powerful influence on
how jurors make their sentencing decision. Moreover, the differing
levels of empathy help solve the riddle that began this Article's inquiry
into how capital juries react to different victim types.
Recall that the "he's-not-a-Hitler-Manson-Bundy" argument gen-
erated strong but very different reactions from many of the jurors.
Some jurors took umbrage at what they perceived to be the implicit
argument that the death penalty should be reserved only for "sensa-
tional" or "headline crimes." Or, as one juror sarcastically summa-
rized the argument, "because someone merely killed a regular human
being, they should get a lesser sentence."
Yet, for other juries, the argument became a central focus of the
jury's discussion-"something to latch onto." Interestingly, these ju-
rors also were uneasy with the notion of comparing murders, and
their explanations were laced with apologetic statements such as, "like
I said, you hate to grade murders," or "it sounds horrible, but the
murder wasn't heinous enough." One juror, after summarizing her
thinking that "a death sentence is the top of the line, and this was not
a top-of-the-line murder, this was not a worst case scenario," immedi-
ately added the guilty afterthought that she did not mean "to devalue
one man's life." Despite their unease, however, these jurors were will-
ing to go the extra step and compare the defendant to other murder-
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ers. The following juror's description of her reasoning process was
fairly typical of those jurors who were receptive to the argument com-
paring murders:
During the arguments at the punishment phase, the attorney said
that [Richard] wasn't the worst of the worst, and it gave me some-
thing to latch onto. His attorney also stressed how [Richard] had
found some meaning to life while in prison. To me it just seemed
[Richard] was not the worst of the worst. He did not fit into my
vision of what the death penalty is for. The defense attorney sug-
gested that. They mentioned on a scale of heinous crimes, there
were worse ones.
So, anyway, we talked all these things over and came to the conclu-
sion-all but one of us-came to the conclusion that the crime was
not the, quote unquote, worst of the worst. That's what the defense
attorney had given us, and it was kind of a phrase that stuck with all
of us.
I thought about a scale-the clich6 of thinking about Manson, but
that kind of crime, that kind of mass murder, serial murder involv-
ing children or women as the worst. I don't know why that seems to
me-children in particular and, unfairly, women before men. Well,
when I compared this crime of [Richard's], even though it was a
terrible crime, it didn't really compare with the worst I could imag-
ine. If it had been some kind of slaughter, that would be different.
After finishing her description of how she had compared crimes, the
juror concluded with the obligatory mea culpa: "I think it's kind of
unfortunate that [Richard's] crime, which was very bad, doesn't seem
all that bad."
So what explains why some jurors were open to comparisons and
others became offended at the very idea that a hierarchy of heinous-
ness exists? The explanation appears to rest at least in part with the
prior finding that ajuror's empathy with the victim plays an important
role in her decision. In almost all of the cases in which jurors were
willing to ponder where the defendant's crime fell on the spectrum of
murderers, the victim was one with whom the jurors were not likely to
identify. This lack of victim identification seemed to enable jurors to
mentally step back and assess how this particular killing compared to
the broader universe of murders. For example, in one case in which
the defense attorneys made the comparison argument, most of the
jurors reacted favorably despite the defendant's two brutal torture
murders. Tellingly, the defendant had "picked up" the victims in an
extremely seedy part of town where the victims were street kids ped-
dling sex and drugs. The jurors felt sympathy for them, but not empa-
thy, and were able to conclude that, despite their brutality, the
defendant's crimes still were not the "worst of the worst." Revealingly,
the one juror in this case who was most resistant to the comparison
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argument was a juror whose own past largely paralleled those of the
victims.
By contrast, when the victim was a "there-but-for-the-grace-of-
God-go-I"-type victim, jurors were far more likely to feel affronted at
the proposed comparison. One need not have a doctorate in psychol-
ogy to postulate that in this type of case the jurors appear to hear the
defense's argument that "this murder of Everyman wasn't so bad com-
pared to . . ." as a tacit suggestion that their lives, the jurors' lives, are
being devalued by proxy. After all, if this victim's demise does not
warrant the death penalty because she was not a victim of a "headline
crime," but was merely a "regular human being" at the "wrong place at
the wrong time," then the jurors' lives also may be discounted some-
day because they did not have the "good fortune" to be dismembered
by a notorious killer rather than dispatched by a garden-variety killer.
IV
FINAL THOUGHTS ON WORTHY AND UNWORTHY VICTIMS
The California CJP data suggest that a juror's perception of the
victim's character and role in the crime can have an important influ-
ence on ajuror's inclination to vote for death or life in a capital case.
Because the California CJP cases offer a wide range of victim types and
behavior, the data are particularly helpful in testing whether the ju-
rors' views of the victim and her actions influence the death penalty
decision. This broad spectrum of victim types, however, also raises a
caveat in applying the findings to other jurisdictions: 49 the jurors'
views of the victim may not be as reliable a predictor in a jurisdiction
where prosecutors pursue the death penalty only (or primarily) in
cases in which the victim is randomly chosen or in which the victim is
likely to have been perceived as an "innocent" because she did not
engage in high-risk or antisocial behavior. In such ajurisdiction, one
would expect other factors to play a heightened role in explaining the
difference between life and death cases.50 To the extent jurors do
49 This caveat also applies to California, as the CJP involved a sampling of cases from
different counties in California, but might not include a representative array of victim types
for any one county. A particular county, for instance, might have guidelines for seeking
the death penalty that in practice would limit cases seeking the death penalty to those
involving non-risk-takin, victims. Another county, on the other hand, might have a policy
of asking for the death penalty in every case involving special circumstances (e.g., to avoid
charges of racial bias), which would likely produce a wide range of victim types.
5o The data suggest, though, that even in such ajurisdiction, randomly chosen victims
would produce a greater likelihood of a death sentence than would the non-random victim
cases. See supra Table 10. One might also expect that such a jurisdiction would have a
higher percentage of death verdicts in cases in which the death penalty was sought than
would ajurisdiction that pursued a death sentence in cases involving a wide range of victim
behavior.
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distinguish between victims based upon their behavior, however, this
Article's findings raise several issues of broad concern.
A. Victim Impact Statements
This Article began with the Booth Court's concern regarding
whether, if allowed to hear VIE, jurors might distinguish between wor-
thy and unworthy victims in making their death penalty decision. This
Article's findings indicate that the answer to the question is not a sim-
ple "yes" or "no."
At least within the California CJP group of cases, jurors appear to
place significant weight on the victim's character and actions in mak-
ing their choice between a Jife and death sentence. In this sense,
then, jurors do distinguish between "worthy" and "unworthy" victims:
random victims who do not engage in risky behavior are more apt to
be deemed "worthy" (and their murderers more deserving of the
death penalty) than are victims who engage in risky, antisocial behav-
ior (and whose murderers are viewed as less deserving of the death
penalty). As we have seen, however, jurors appear to react most
strongly to the victim's specific actions leading up to the crime, rather
than to the victim's general status or reputation. As noted earlier, the
differences between life and death outcomes within any one demo-
graphic category tend to correlate with the victim's risk taking and
whether the victim was randomly chosen.5 1
Granted, it still can be argued that a jury making life and death
determinations based on guilt-phase evidence that suggests that the
victim was "of questionable character" because she was buying drugs
from the defendant (or, vice versa, that she was a "sterling member of
the community" because the guilt-phase evidence shows that she was
dutifully doing herjob when randomly robbed and killed), runs afoul
of the concern that the death penalty will be arbitrarily imposed based
on victim characteristics. Such a view, however, does not appear to
have been the Booth majority's core concern, which focused more on
social class and standing than on the victim's actions, 52 and would run
against the general view of criminal jurisprudence that a victim's ac-
tions can bear on the defendant's culpability and just deserts. 53
51 See supra Part I.C.
52 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text. Although the California CJP sample
sizes are far too small to have statistical significance, the percentage of death sentences for
"white collar" victims (60% based on five cases), "blue collar" victims (60% based on 15
cases) and unemployed victims (50% based on only two victims) do not raise immediate
red flags. Further study is needed to see whether social status makes a difference within
any one category of victims once they are categorized based on their actions.
53 See generally Joshua Dressier, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a
Difjfcult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959 (2002) (discussing provocation as a justification or
excuse defense).
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Even more fundamentally, trying to banish such evidence from
the guilt phase poses serious practical problems. Justice Souter, in his
Payne concurrence, argued that a prohibition against VIE realistically
could never be implemented because juries inevitably will learn facts
about the victim at the guilt phase that they will take into account at
the sentencing phase.54 If, as Justice Souter argues, it would be almost
impossible to keep out evidence about the crime that sheds a positive
light on the victim (he gives the hypothetical example of a minister
who is murdered while running an errand to the church and the kill-
ing is witnessed by his wife and daughter) 55 it would be even more
difficult to keep out guilt-phase evidence placing the victim in a nega-
tive light, such as evidence that the victim was killed as part of a drug
deal with the defendant.
Particularly telling on this score and adding substance to Justice
Souter's argument is the fact that most of the cases in the California
CJP were tried while VIE was still barred in California. 56 Indeed, one
of the jurors' most common complaints during the interviews was how
unfair it was that the jury heard all about the defendant but learned
almost nothing about the victim. As one juror said:
We didn't have a lot of evidence about [the victim]. We weren't
supposed to take the victim into consideration, the fact that his fam-
ily was left without a father and those kinds of things. It's almost
like he, personally, didn't matter. It's kind of depressing to think
of-it didn't really matter about him as an individual.
Yet, despite the prohibition on VIE at the sentencing phase, the juror
interviews demonstrate that they learned information about the victim
during the guilt phase that influenced their sentencing decision.
What might one expect, then, now that VIE is formally allowed
into the sentencing proceeding? Any answer must, of course, await
studies of the post-Payne effects of VIE, but one possibility is that such
evidence will not have the blanket effect on capital sentencing out-
comes that one might have first expected after Payne.57 If, as the find-
54 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 840-41 (1991) (SouterJ., concurring). Jus-
tice Souter did recognize the possibility of banning all references in the guilt phase to
victim characteristics unknown to the defendant, or requiring separate guilt and sentenc-
ing juries, but did not believe that either measure was practically or legally feasible. See id.
at 839-42 (Souter, J., concurring).
55 See id. at 840.
56 The California Supreme Court held in 1992 that evidence and argument concern-
ing the specific harm caused by the defendant is generally admissible under state law as a
circumstance of the capital crime. See People v. Pride, 833 P.2d 643 (Cal. 1992).
57 The South Carolina CJP, in comparing pre- and post-Payne cases, found that VIE
had no discernable statistical effect on sentencing outcome. See Theodore Eisenberg et al.,
Victim Characteristics and Victim Ipact Evidence in South Carolina Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L.
REv. 306, 335 (2003). However, because of the possibility that the profile of victims in
South Carolina cases did not include the same variety of risk-taking victims as the Califor-
20031
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ings indicate, jurors already are inclined toward a death sentence if
the victim was a random or "innocent" victim, 58 learning that such a
victim was indeed a "sterling member of the community" might prima-
rily serve to confirm the jury's decision to impose a death sentence.
Similarly, any "negative" evidence casting the victim as a risk taker or
antisocial actor almost certainly will first have been developed during
the guilt phase as evidence bearing on the commission of the crime.
This guilt-phase evidence would render sentencing evidence casting
the victim in an adverse light redundant in terms of the jurors'
predilections. 59
This is not to suggest, however, that the debate over VIE's effects
has been much ado about nothing. Even if further studies should
show that allowing VIE at the sentencing phase does not have a great
overall effect on cases, it seems likely that VIE will still affect certain
types of cases, such as those in which the aggravating and mitigating
evidence are roughly in equipoise. As we have seen, a case involving a
nonrandom victim who was not a risk taker, for example, presents a
fact profile about which jurors may be on the fence going into the
penalty phase, and therefore would likely be receptive to strong miti-
gating evidence that the defendant's life circumstances never really
offered him a choice of the "high road.""'' Such a case in mitigation,
however, often heavily depends upon family testimony,61 and VIE may
diminish a juror's receptivity to the power of such mitigating
evidence. 62
For instance, in one of the few California CJP cases in which VIE
was allowed, ajuror explained that at first he was moved by the defen-
dant's mother's testimony when she "pleaded for life without parole
so she could have some time to call him and write to him." The juror
continued, however, that the defendant's mother's testimony was
largely negated by the victim's mother who said, "That was not
thought about when they killed [my son]. I can't talk to him. I can't
write to him." The juror observed, "The battle between the two
mothers was real dramatic." In the end, therefore, although the juror
nia cases, VIE's lack of a statistical effect in South Carolina may have been caused by other
factors.
58 See supra Part III.A.
59 Payne appears to allow a defendant to rebut positive VIE (although such a defense
tactic is fraught with obvious peril), but does not appear to allow a defendant to introduce
negative evidence about a victim as a mitigating factor. See Robert P. Mosteller, The Effect of
Victim-Impact Evidence on the Defense, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1993, at 24, 63.
60 See Sundby, suna note 3, at 1136.
61 See id. at 1151-62.
62 See Edith Greene, The Many Guises of Victim Inpact Evidence and Effects on Jurors'Judg-
ments, 5 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 331 (1999) (finding that VIE that increased a person's posi-
tive opinion of a victim lessened the weight the person would give to mitigating evidence
about the defendant).
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"felt sorry" for the defendant's mother, the juror explained that, "it
really did not influence us. We had to go by the facts." VIE, there-
fore, may prove to be most critical in those cases in which a mix of
factors is pulling the jury in different directions on life and death, and
information about the victim or the effect of the killing on the victim's
survivors will heighten or dampen the relative influence of the various
factors.63
If this hypothesis is correct, then one might also expect that the
mix of victim cases being pursued by a jurisdiction's prosecutors (as
well as the scope of VIE allowed in the jurisdiction) will influence
VIE's effects. In a jurisdiction where capital case selection primarily
focuses on victims who will be seen by jurors as "innocent" and stable,
VIE might be less likely to play an influential role because jurors al-
ready will be leaning toward death on the "victim factor," leaving any
movement toward a life sentence primarily dependent on other fac-
tors (e.g., that the defendant played a lesser role in the crime) .64 In-
versely, the greater the range of victim types, the more likely it is that a
middle range of cases Wvill emerge in which the "victim factor" in the
guilt phase has not yet firmly cast jurors toward death or life (the
clearest category of this type of case being the nonrandom but non-
risk-taking victim), and in which strong, positive VIE may sway the ju-
rors toward death. In such a jurisdiction, one would expect to find
that the advent of VIE has influenced the outcome of at least this mid-
dle category of cases.
The possibility also exists that VIE might "rehabilitate" a risk-tak-
ing victim with whom the jury otherwise would not empathize. 65 The
victim who met the defendant at a biker bar, for instance, might trig-
ger a more positive reaction among jurors if VIE were to reveal that
she had been a loving daughter who had nursed her mother through
a long illness. If this effect does occur, the potential exists for shifting
toward death sentences a group of cases that this Article's findings
suggest usually would result in life sentences. Further study of VIE's
effects may provide the answer to questions like these, as well as pro-
63 Negative information about the victim might also have this effect if introduced in
rebuttal to positive VIE. Compare Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237, 1263 n.13 (2002)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that defense attorney's failure to use evidence that would
have rebutted victim's mother's claim that "all [she] lived for was that boy [the victim]"
demonstrated that the lawyer's conflict of interest had an "adverse effect" on the lawyer's
representation of the defendant (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted)), with id. at 1247 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding that lawyer's "failure to at-
tack the character of the seventeen-year-old victim and his mother .. was rejected [as a
strategy] likely to backfire").
64 See Sundby, supra note 4, at 1614-16.
65 Cf Eisenberg et al., supra note 57, at 325 (finding that after VIE was allowed, juror
perception of victim admirability increased in a manner "fully consistent with growing and
improving use of VIE by prosecutors").
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vide further insight into how jurors process evidence about the victim
both apart from and in tandem with evidence regarding the victim's
role in the crime.
B. The EmpatheticJuror
A substantial body of experimental literature has established the
basic proposition that the more a decision maker identifies and em-
pathizes with the person being judged, the more likely the decision
maker is to adopt that person's perspective. 611 This proposition stands
in general accord with both the CJP jurors' narratives describing the
victims in their cases and the jurors' attitudes based on the victim's
actions leading up to the crime. This is not to suggest that the degree
of juror empathy with the victim can fully explain the outcome of any
one case or even any one juror's decision. Similar to the research
findings on decision making in rape cases, 67 one would expect to find
a highly complex interaction of factors entering the decision-making
process of capital jurors.
To the extent, however, that juror empathy (or lack of empathy)
with the murder victim does color a juror's view of factors such as the
crime's seriousness or the defendant's dangerousness, defense coun-
sel should heed the implications. Realizing that a case involving a ran-
domly chosen victim is particularly likely to raise dangerousness
concerns and to make the jurors view the offense as serious, defense
counsel should think carefully before pursuing tactics that the jury
might construe as suggesting that the murder was not as heinous com-
pared to other possible crimes. Likewise, defense counsel with a case
involving a risk-taking or unsympathetic victim will need to consider
how best to present that information to the jury. Without entering
the ethical debate of just how far defense counsel may go in raising
questions about a victim's character, this Article's findings suggest that
defense counsel in such a case will need to take into account that
jurors appear to consider the victim's role in the crime when assessing
the defendant's overall culpability.
From a broader policy standpoint, findings that appear to verify a
juror's tendency to empathize with certain victim types call for contin-
ued research on the effects of race. Given prior studies that have
found that the victim's race has a statistically significant effect on the
66 See, e.g., Lynda Olsen-Fulero & Solomon M. Fulero, Commonsense Rape Judgments: An
Empathy-Complexity Theory of RapeJuror Story Making, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 402, 409-10
(1997) (summarizing the literature on juror empathy).
67 See id. at 418-20. The authors attribute the "inconsistent and confusing results of
rape-responsibility research" to researchers' efforts to "fragmentize a highly complex phe-
nomenon." Id. at 418.
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likelihood of death sentences, 68 questions naturally arise as to the role
ofjuror empathy in causing this effect. William Bowers and coauthors
already have conducted groundbreaking work demonstrating that the
race of capital jurors affects their views on issues such as lingering
doubt, the defendant's dangerousness, the defendant's remorse, and
the importance of the mitigation evidence.29 If a juror's degree of
empathy with the victim influences the death penalty decision, as this
Article's findings suggest, it becomes important to know whether fac-
tors such as race or socioeconomic background (of either the victim
or the juror) have an effect on whether a juror will empathize with
certain types of victims more than others.
71
CONCI.USION
Much debate and speculation have surrounded the question of
whether juries should be allowed to consider evidence about the vic-
tim in making their capital punishment decision. Although an under-
standing of how capital juries use victim evidence cannot by itself
resolve the debate, such an understanding can help better focus the
moral and legal issues that are at stake.
A review of the California CJP data suggests that capital juries are
influenced by victim evidence, at least to the extent that the evidence
pertains to the victim's actions leading up to the crime. A randomly
chosen victim appears to tilt the jury toward a death sentence, both
because juries see a defendant who preys upon a randomly chosen
victim as the most dangerous and depraved of criminals, and because
jurors are most likely to empathize with a victim who is engaged in
everyday activities. By contrast, a victim who is engaged in high-risk or
antisocial behavior leading up to the crime is less likely to invoke an
empathetic response from the jury or to provoke a sense of outrage,
which, in turn, appears to make the jury less inclined to impose a
death sentence.
68 The most comprehensive statistical look at the death penalty is the Baldus Study,
which used multiple regression analysis accounting for 230 possible factors. See David C.
Baldus et al., Law and Statistics in Conflict: Reflections on McCleskey v. Kemp, in HANDBOOK
OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 251 (D.K. Kagehiro & W.S. Laufer eds., 1992) (presenting statisti-
cal research indicating that an African-American defendant who kills a white victim has a
significantly greater likelihood of receiving a sentence of death); see also David C. Baldus et
al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal
Oveprview, with Recent Findingsfiom Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998) (presenting
the results of research on racial disparities in capital sentencing in Philadelphia).
69 William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of
the Role of Jurors' Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 171 (2001).
70 See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAw 347-50 (1997) (discuss-
ing the role of race and empathy in the criminal justice system). The California CJP did
not include sufficient numbers of victims from different racial and ethnic groups to allow
reliable conclusions to be drawn about how the victim's race might affect juror empathy.
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These findings suggest, therefore, that even without the formal
admission of VIE at the penalty phase, victim evidence from the guilt
phase will play a role in the sentencing decision, an effect that Justice
Souter predicted in his Booth concurrence. Further research is
needed to determine whether VIE has its own independent effect on
the jury's sentencing decision or mainly serves to reinforce the jury's
sentencing inclination coming out of the guilt phase. The finding
that jurors are likely to empathize with certain victims also highlights
the need to determine whether such empathy is limited to the victim's
role in the crime (a factor the criminal law has traditionally accepted
as legitimate) or extends further to illegitimate factors such as race
and socioeconomic status.
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APPENDIX TABLES
APPENDIX TABLE 1
EFFECT OF VICTIM TYPE ON JUROR'S DECISION TO SENTENCE DEATH
Much More Slightly Slightly Much Less
Victim Type Likely More Likely No Effect Less Likely Likely
Stranger in the
community
(n = 144) 1% 1% 96% 0% 1%
Was an alcoholic
(n = 143) 1% 1% 92% 6% 1%
Was a drug addict
(n = 142) 1% 2% .89% 6% 2%
Female
(n = 130) 5% 5% 87% 2% 1%
Respected member of
community
(n = 132) 3% 8% 86% 2% 2%
Had a loving family
(n = 127) 6% 14% 76% 2% 2%
Had a criminal record
(n = 143) 3% 6% 73% 15% 4%
Known troublemaker
(n= 145) 1% 3% 68% 25% 3%
Child
(n = 140) 53% 24% 23% 0% 1%
APPENDIX TABLE 2
AMOUNT OF JURY DISCUSSION TIME FOCUSED ON
"THE REPUTATION OR CHARACTER OF THE VICTIM"
Juror Type Great Deal Fair Amount Not Much None at All
All Jurors
(n = 150)' 11% 32% 33% 25%
Life Jurors
(n = 68) 9% 41% 32% 18%
Death Jurors
(n = 78) 13% 23% 35% 29%
'The overall number ofjurors reporting responses includes the responses of four
jurors who served on ajury that hung on the sentence; consequently, the n factor
for "all jurors" is higher than that of the life and death jurors added together.
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APPENDIX TABLE 3
AMOUNT OF JURY DISCUSSION TIME FOCUSED ON
"THE VICTIM'S ROLE OR RESPONSIBILITY IN THE CRIME"
Juror Type A Great Deal A Fair Amount Not Much None at All
All Jurors
(n = 150)' 18% 21% 30% 31%
Life Jurors
(n = 68) 22% 31% 29% 18%
Death Jurors
(n = 78) 15% 14% 29% 41%
'The overall number ofjurors reporting responses includes the responses of four
jurors who served on ajury that hung on the sentence; consequently, the n factor
for "all jurors" is higher than that of the life and death jurors added together.
APPENDIX TABLE 4
JUROR'S IMPRESSION OF How ACCURATELY
"INNOCENT OR HELPLESS" DESCRIBES THE VICTIM
juror Type Very Well Fairly Well Not Well Not at All
Life Juror
(n = 70) 46% (32) 16% (11) 14% (10) 24% (17)
Death Juror
(n = 77) 86% (66) 5% (4) 4% (3) 5% (4)
APPENDIX TABLE 5
JUROR'S IMPRESSION OF How ACCURATELY
"HAD AN UNSTABLE OR DISTURBED PERSONALITY"
DESCRIBES THE VICTIM
Juror Type Very Well Fairly Well Not Well Not at All
Life juror
(n = 61) 12% (7) 26% (16) 13% (8) 49% (30)
Death juror
(n = 58) 2% (1) 5% (3) 14% (8) 79% (46)
APPENDIX TABLE 6
JUROR'S IMPRESSION OF How ACCURATELY
"HAD A PROBLEM WITH DRUGS OR ALCOHOL" DESCRIBES THE VICTIM
Juror Type Very Well Fairly Well Not Well Not at All
Life Juror
(n = 58) 28% (16) 22% (13) 10% (6) 40% (23)
Death juror
(n = 57) 14% (8) 9% (5) 14% (8) 63% (36)
20031 THE CAPITAL JURY AND EMPATHY
APPENDIX TABLE 7
JUROR'S IMPRESSION OF How ACCURATELY
"LONER WITHOUT MANY FRIENDS" DESCRIBES THE VICTIM
Juror Type Very Well Fairly Well Not Well Not at All
Life Juror
(n = 58) 7% (4) 26% (15) 26% (15) 41% (24)
Death Juror
(n = 53) 0% (0) 8% (4) 34% (18) 58% (31)
APPENDIX TABLE 8
JUROR'S IMPRESSION OF HOW ACCURATELY
"ADMIRED OR RESPECTED IN THE COMMUNITY" DESCRIBES THE VICTIM
Juror Type Very Well Fairly Well Not Well Not at All
Life Juror
(n= 67) 18% (12) 16% (11) 21% (14) 45% (30)
Death Juror
(n = 67) 22% (15) 39% (26) 21% (14) 18% (12)
APPENDIX TABLE 9
JUROR'S IMPRESSION OF How ACCURATELY
"Too CARELESS OR RECKLESS" DESCRIBES THE VICTIM
Juror Type Very Well Fairly Well Not Well Not at All
Life juror
(n = 64) 31% (20) 20% (13) 16% (10) 33% (21)
Death Juror
(n = 70) 4% (3) 7% (5) 17% (12) 71% (50)
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APPENDIX TABLE 10
SENTENCING OUTCOME BASED ON VICTIM TYPE AND RISK TAKING
Number of
Victim Classisfication Cases Death Life Hung
Number of Victims
Single Victims 14 29% (4) 71% (10) 0% (0)
No-risk 9 44% (4) 56% (5) 0% (0)
Risk Taking 5 0% (0) 100% (5) 0% (0)
Multiple Victims 23 65% (15) 30% (7) 4% (1)
No-risk 12 92% (11) 0% (0) 8% (1)
Risk Taking 11 36% (4) 64% (7) 0% (0)
Victim's Gender
Female 12 58% (7) 42% (5) 0% (0)
No-risk 9 67% (6) 33% (3) 0% (0)
Risk Taking 3 33% (1) 67% (2) 0% (0)
Male 25 48% (12) 48% (12) 4% (1)
No-risk 12 75% (9) 17% (2) 8% (1)
Risk Taking 13 23% (3) 77% (10) 0% (0)
Victim's Marital Status
Single/Divorced 22 33% (7) 68% (15) 0% (0)
No-risk 8 63% (5) 38% (3) 0% (0)
Risk Taking 14 14% (2) 86% (12) 0% (0)
Married 13 85% (11) 8% (1) 8% (1)
No-risk 12 83% (10) 8% (1) 8% (1)
Risk Taking 1 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0)
Victim's Parental Status
Had Children 20 60% (12) 35% (7) 5% (1)
No-risk 12 83% (10) 8% (1) 8% (1)
Risk Taking 8 25% (2) 75% (6) 0% (0)
No Children l 27% (3) 73% (8) 0% (0)
No-risk 5 40% (2) 60% (3) 0% (0)
Risk Taking 6 17% (1) 83% (5) 0% (0)
Note: Because ofjuror uncertainty over the victim's marital status in 2 cases and
parental status in 6 cases, those classifications do not include all 37 cases.
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APPENDIX TABLE 11 (FOR TABLES 13-15)
JURORS' IMAGINING SELVES IN VICTIM'S POSITION
Imagined Self Did Not Imagine
in Victim's Self in Victim's
Position Position
Juror Type (Sample Size) % of Jurors % of Jurors
By Penalty
All Jurors (n = 152) 47 53
Life Juror (n = 7 0) 37 63
Death Juror (n = 78) 56 44
Hung Juror (n = 4) 25 75
By Relation
Random Victim Cases (n = 49) 65 35
Life Juror (n = 6) 67 33
Death Juror (n = 39) 69 31
Hung Juror (n = 4) 25 75
Nonrandom Victim Cases (n = 103) 38 62
Life Juror (n = 64) 34 66
Death Juror (n = 39) 44 56
By Risk
No Risk Victim Cases (n = 88) 56 44
Life Juror (n = 22) 50 50
Death Juror (n = 62) 60 40
Hung Juror (n = 4) 25 75
Risk-Taking Victims (n = 64) 34 66
Life Juror (n = 48) 31 69
Death Juror (n = 16) 44 56
2003]
